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THE INJUNCTION AS A REMEDY FOR THE
BOYCOTT.
A boycott is a system of social and business ostracism. It
signifies, in a general way, a combination of many to withdraw
from an individual their own beneficial intercourse, and the inter-
course of all others whom they can influence. If this is accom-
plished by an exercise of the lawful rights of the combination,
without a violation of the corresponding rights of the individual,
it is legal, although it results in his financial and commercial ruin.
Illustrations of this are of frequent occurrence in the commercial
world, and are regarded simply as competitive acts in the ordinary
course of trade.' The right of an individual or corporation to
refuse to employ men who trade with, or are tenants of, persons
objectionable to them also illustrates this legal system of boycot-
ting.2 If, however, this ostracism, is accomplished by unlawful
means, such as forcing outsiders by threats or intimidations
against their will to withdraw their beneficial intercourse, the
entire legal complexion of the combination changes. Character-
ized by unlawful acts it savors of conspiracy, which is held to be a
combination of two or more persons to do an illegal act, and all
those aiding or abetting are fellow conspirators. No overt act is
necessary to make them amenable to the common law.8 The
mere conspiring to coerce unlawfully is the gist of the crime.
The combination now becomes a criminal boycott, which is more
concisely defined as a conspiracy to injure or ruin an individual
by directly or indirectly preventing his carrying on any business,
and by unlawfully coercing others to withdraw from him their
beneficial intercourse through threats that unless they do so they
will also suffer injury.4 "
The criminal boycott is the recognized weapon of labor unions,
and is used by them with unremitting vigor and frequently with
1 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23 L. R. Q. B. D. 598.
2 Payne v. Western, etc., R. R. Co., 13 Lea 507; Heywood v. Tillson, 75
Me. 225.
3 State v. Glidden, 55 Ct. 46.
4 See Anderson's and Black's Law Dictionaries.
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great success, to secure from their employers acquiescence to
their numerous and varied demands. In most cases it is intro-
duced by, and used conjointly with, a strike. Strikes which consist
in a simple withdrawal of the employ6s are legal, except when
they sever contractual relations, or endanger life or property; 5 but
in most fields of industry they are ineffective in securing the
desired concessions because of the large supply of laborers ready to
take the strikers' places, preventing thereby any serious delay or
financial loss to a business. It is then that the boycott is applied
with terrible effectiveness by driving out the employ6s remaining
at work, through coercion, intimidation or violence, by forcibly
restraining those who would take the strikers' places, and by pre-
venting through intimidation the employer's regular line of cus-
tomers, and even the public at large, from dealing with him.
The sole purpose of the boycott is to break or ruin the employer
through an annihilation of his business by severing all his rela-
tions, mercantile and industrial, contractual and voluntary, and
thus to deprive him of even the means of sustenance. It is an
organized system of coercion or revenge, opposed to the public
weal and subversive of our fundamental principles of govern-
ment.
The law is not opposed to combinations for good, but favors
and protects them. Both in England and this country labor
unions, having for their object the advancement of the moral,
social and intellectual development of their members, the securing
of fair compensation with reasonable hours and conditions of
labor, and the raising of funds for the care of their sick, disabled
or unemployed members, are encouraged and chartered by law.
6
But it does not favor or permit such organizations to invade the
rights of others by coercing men against their will to join them,
or to force men out of employment who are satisfied with their
remuneration, or in any unlawful manner to interfere with an
employer in the management of his business. Both employer
and employ6 have a constitutional right to use their capital, labor
or skill as they please, without restraint from outside parties, and
any attempt by force, threat or intimidation to control an
employer in his method of conducting his business, or to dictate
whom he shall or shall not employ, or what wages he shall pay;
or any interference with an employ6 by forcing him into a labor
organization, or compelling him to quit work, or in any direct or
r 38 and 39 Victoria, chap. 86, 1875.
6 22 Vict., c. 34; 32 and 33 Vict., c. 61; 34 and 35 Vict., c. 31; 24 Stat., c.
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indirect manner attempting to control his freedom of action, is
illegal and will not be tolerated. The entire system, opposed to
the peace, prosperity and civilization of our country, well merits
the condemnation placed on it by the grand jury of the Theiss
boycott," who referred to it in their indictment as "an accursed
exotic," and "a hydra-headed monster dragging its loathsome
length across the contifient and sucking the very life-blood from
our trade and commerce."
The remedies afforded by courts of law for this pernicious sys-
tem are two,-a criminal action, resulting in case of conviction
in fine or imprisonment, and a civil action for damages to the
injured party. In equity, however, an injunction will be granted
to prevent the further continuance of an existing wrong or the
commission of a threatened wrong. There is a strong tendency,
especially noticeable in the last few years, to seek relief from a
boycott through a court of equity rather than through a court of
law. This is due to the marked difference in the relief afforded
by each of the courts, arising from their different modes of pro-
cedure. The common law theory is, that a man must not be
interfered with until he has committed a wrong, while the equity
theory is that the ideal remedy is one which precludes the com-
mission of a wrong, rather than that which awards punishment or
satisfaction for a wrong after it is committed. Acting on this
theory, the common law does not attempt to prevent the commis-
sion of a wrong directly, but contents itself with threatening a
would-be transgressor with a fine or imprisonment if he commits
a public wrong, and with the payment of such damages to an
injured party as will restore him to his original position, if he
commits a private wrong. When no overt act has been committed
in a conspiracy, there is often great difficulty in securing evidence
necessary for conviction, and even when procurable, the invisible
bond of sympathy which too frequently exists between a jury and
the indicted conspirators causes a verdict to be rendered with a
plea for clemency. The payment of fines to the State or the
imprisonment of wrongdoers are punishments for the general
-wrong done the public, but in no sense do they compensate for
the special wrong done the individual. Compensation for the
individual is secured only by a civil suit, but if the theory that a
pecuniary compensation cures all private wrongs were correct,
which it is not, it is obvious that a practical application of it would
and does fail in many cases. Some injuries are of an irreparable
-nature and cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard, or if
7 People 'v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 403.
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capable of such measurement, the insolvency of the wrongdoer
precludes the restoration of the injured party.
Equity, however, acting on the broader theory that justice
requires that no wrong be done, has processes especially adapted
to secure these ends, the most powerful of which is the writ of
injunction. This is a restraining order, issued by the court on
application of a complainant with suitable affidavits, commanding
those on whom it is served to refrain from doing, and in rare cases
to do, certain acts. Once served, it prevents the commission of
threatened wrongs, or causes the cessation of continuing wrongs,
by placing in contempt of court all those who disobey the com-
mand. It is the most powerful process issuing out of either a law
or equity court, and is sometimes referred to as the strong arm of
the law, and is applied with great caution. It is issued only when
the rights of the respective parties are certain, and not for the
prevention of naked trespasses or criminal acts unconnected with
property rights. There must be a strong probability of positive,
substantial and irreparable injury to warrant the court's interfer-
ence, and not mere irregular and unauthorized acts which have no
injurious consequences. Both in England and this country the
granting of injunctions is largely in the discretion of the court,
and jurisdiction is never assumed where there is a plain, adequate
and complete remedy to be had in a court of law. A few recent
cases will show the grounds upon which courts will issue this writ,
and its adaptability to fit varied circumstances and prevent the
commission of a class of wrongs of a continuing nature which can-
not be redressed, or only inadequately redressed, in a court of law.
With great unanimity the courts of both countries hold that
acts which tend to misrepresent a business, to its injury and that
of the proprietor, are mere libels and will not be restrained; 8 but
where the attempt to injure consists of acts or words tending to
intimidate and prevent customers from dealing with, or laborers
from working for, a party, an injunction will lie.
In Springhead Spinning Co. v,. Riley, 9 striking spinners pla-
carded the town and published in the papers a request that all
sympathizers with their union avoid the company's office until the
settlement of the trade dispute. The Court held that there.was
sufficient ground for an injunction, as the scheme was by intimi-
dation to prevent persons accepting work from the plaintiff and
as a consequence to destroy his business.
8 Cent. Law Journal, Vol. 35, 415; Francis v. Flinn, 1i8 U. S. 385; Kidd
v. Horry, 28 Fed. Rep. 774; Clark v. Freeman, ii Beav. 112.
9 L. R. 6 Eq. 55i.
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This decision was supported in Sherry v. Perkins,'
0 where
strikers in complainant's shop were restrained from marching
back and forth before it with banners, requesting all workmen to,
keep away, and by their number intimidating those who wished
to work.
In Casey v. Cincinnati Typo-Union, " an injunction was main-
tained to prevent members of a labor union from circulating
hand-bills and making personal calls, in which they requested the
news dealers to cease handling the papers of the complainant, the
advertisers to withdraw their "ads," and the public generally to
withdraw their patronage, accompanied by implied threats of
injury if they failed to comply.
In Murdock, Kerr & Co. v. Walker,' 2 an injunction was issued
to restrain members of a union from forcibly preventing the ship-
ping of a crew, as the acts were in restraint of trade, and "for the
reason that damages at law for interrupting the business, and
intercepting the profits of pending enterprises and voyages, must
in their nature be conjectural and not susceptible of proof."
Unlawful interference with a business by picketing the works
and forcibly escorting laborers filling strikers' places out of the
State, has been restrained. The Court held that the avoidance of
a multiplicity of suits, and the fact that the defendants were
insolvent, were "both prime reasons that appealed to a court of
equity for its preventive relief.
1 8
The scope, power and economic advantages of this remedy are
forcibly shown in the cases of the Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Penn.
Co. et al.,14 where a labor organization composed of engineers
declared a boycott against the plaintiff's road, and by intimidation
compelled all connecting roads to assist them by refusing to
exchange freight cars with the boycotted road. The effect of such
a boycott would have been the tying up of the railroad, the cutting
off from the rest of the country of the entire territory through
which its tracks lay as arteries of trade, the suspension of manufac-
tories and business houses along its line, and the infliction of great
inconvenience and suffering on many thousands of citizens within
and without that territory, wholly innocent of the cause of the
trouble. At the prayer of the complainant, a mandatory injunction
was issued, compelling the chief of the labor organization to recall
10 147 Mass. 212.
1145 Fed. Rep. 135.
12 152 Pa. 595.
18 Hagan v. Blindell, 54- Fed. Rep. 40.
14 Toledo A. A. & N. M. R. R. Co. v. Pa. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 73o, also 746.
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his order commanding the engineers on defendant roads to quit
work for the purpose of coercing them into a refusal to handle
the cars, such a refusal being a violation of the interstate com-
merce laws; and another mandatory injunction was granted, com-
pelling the defendant roads to handle the cars, on the grounds that
"the case was urgent, the rights of the parties free from reason-
able doubt, and the duty sought to be enforced was imposed by
law."
An injunction of even greater breadth than any of the preced-
ing, which penetrates to the very root of strikes and boycotts, and
because of its scope, has brought the whole subject of injunctions
under a present special investigation by the Judiciary Committee
of the United States Senate, is that issued by Judge Jenkins of
the Circuit Court, restraining the executive officers of the various
organizations of railway employ6s "from ordering, recommending,
advising or approving by communication, or instruction or other-
wise, the employ6s * * * of the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company * * * to join in a strike on January 1, 1894, or at
any other time, until further order of this court," and restraining
the employ6s themselves "from so quitting the services of the
said receivers [of the Northern Pac. Railroad] with or without
notice, as to cripple the property, or to prevent or hinder the ope-
ration of said road." Such an order, at first reading, appears to
enslave the employds and deprive them of their unquestioned right
to work when, and for whom, they please, but the Court, dis-
tinctly acknowledging that right, held that it was a relative and
not an absolute right. Prior to entering service it was undoubt-
edly absolute, but. the moment the relation of employer and
'employ6 was established it became relative, and the employ~s
possessed no legal right to quit premeditatedly the service of the
road at such a time and in such a manner as to injure it. A law-
ful condition precedent to the exercise of their right of withdrawal,
was the giving of such reasonable notice as would prevent the
crippling of the road and the mail, telegraph and express facilities
afforded by it to the public. 15
So frequent have become the outbreaks in the industrial world
between the representatives of capital and labor, and so severe
and far-reaching are the injuries inflicted by the latter, that the
demand for relief through a writ of injunction is constantly
increasing, and no brarich of the law is in a more rapid state of
development, but while the principles governing its issue are sim-
15 Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 60 Fed. Rep.
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ple, it frequently taxes the judgment of our most learned judges
to apply them. The cases summarized show a willingness of
courts of equity to assume jurisdiction and issue injunctions when
irreparable injury can thereby be avoided, when it is apparent
that a pecuniary compensation will be inadequate, when the par-
ties are insolvent and cannot respond in damages, and when a
multiplicity of suits can be avoided.
From the inherent nature of an injunction, it is especially
suited to give relief from the threatened injuries of a boycott. It
is easily and quickly secured, it is promptly and effectively served,
it is preventive as well as remedial, it gives immediate and posi-
tive relief, it is binding on all within or without the jurisdiction of
the court, it maintains the relative positions of the parties with
justice to each, it may be moulded to the peculiar circumstances
of each case, it may be dissolved, revived, continued, extended or
contracted, it may be special, preliminary, temporary or perpetual;
in short, it is especially adapted to prevent the commission of
wrongs and preserve the rights of all parties.
Herbert S. Bullard.
